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COMMENT ON BAKER, "DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND
DISCRIMINATION: A PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE"
WILLIAM

H.

RIKER*

On the whole, I agree with Professor Baker's purpose and conclusion. I do, however, disagree with one feature of her argument and, indeed, of the arguments of her chosen opponents, Eule and Bell. This
disagreement leads me to urge a slight modification of her conclusions.
In listing the differences between representative and plebiscitary institutions, she and her opponents omit what seems to me a difference at
least as important as any they do list, namely, the control of the agenda
in the two legislative systems. The difference is quite clear: In a referendum, the agenda is set, almost always and almost entirely, by the author
of the initiative, while, in the representative system, the agenda is set by a
combination of the legislature's majority party (or a committee of it),
back benchers who in one way or another insert themselves in the
agenda-setting process, and the pre-existing legislative rules.
Holding tastes constant, agendas do, to a considerable degree, determine outcomes. This is why legislators angrily and craftily dispute about
agendas, although ordinary citizens usually think the subject arcane and
trivial.' It is precisely these matters, which legislators know to be determinative, that the initiative system turns over to whomever in the general
public takes the trouble to grab for them. It would be strange indeed if
this difference in the location of agenda-setting authority did not make
some difference in the content of outcomes.
To appreciate the complications of agendas, I offer an example of a
University of Rochester
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set of motions in a cycle. By reason of McKelvey's chaos theorem, we
know that, on any subject with two or more dimensions, the set of infinite
possibilities for alternative motions is always cyclical. 2 So a cyclical example is characteristic of most moderately complicated subjects of legislation, whether dealt with by representative or plebiscitary institutions.
In the most abstract case, with three alternatives and three persons (or
factions) using simple majority rule on a binary agenda, the social choice,
given the cycle, depends entirely on the agenda. In Figure 1, I have
shown that, with the forward cycle, the three possible agendas for three
alternatives each result in a victory for the alternative not in the initial
binary choice. Consequently, given the cycle, which one of the three alternatives wins depends entirely on which agenda is used.
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If we now complicate this example with rules about the construction
of the agenda, it is apparent that they help to fix the outcome. In Figure
2, I have identified one of the motions as the status quo. (In AngloAmerican parliamentary procedure, agendas usually provide that the status quo, if one exists, enter the agenda last. The rationale is that the
body should first perfect that which is intended to displace the status
quo. Except in unusual cases (e.g., perfect information), the later a motion enters the voting, the better its opportunity to win. So Anglo-American procedure conservatively, and in my opinion, properly gives an
advantage to the status quo.) With the motion C now identified as SQ,
2. See generally McKelvey, supra note 1.
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the parliamentary agenda over three alternatives is thus fixed: initially A
and B must meet, then the winner meets SQ.
FIGURE

2 AGENDAS WITH AND WITHOUT A RULE FOR PERFECTION
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Suppose, with c still fixed as SQ, that some initiating interest group
makes the decision on which motion is to face the status quo in a referendum. If the group chooses A, then SQ triumphs. But there is no need for
the group to choose A because there is no existing rule about the perfection of alternatives to the status quo. The interest group may choose B,
in which case B triumphs. So in this simple three alternative case, in a
representative assembly, where there is a rule about perfection of alternatives, the status quo wins for certain, while in a plebiscite, with informed
and capable proposers, some substantive displacement of the status quo
may win, even though the majority prefers the status quo to some other
substantive motion.
In general, the same advantage for manipulation resides in the initiator of a plebiscite, regardless of the number of alternatives and motions.
It is true that opponents of a referendum may introduce other alternative referenda. This turns the procedure from binary to n-ary and the
outcome may be expected to vary. While this situation is not well understood, I believe it often advantages the status quo insofar as the voters
interpret the situation correctly, that is, if they see that they should vote
for only one of the alternative proposals. If so, then the substantive winner, if it exists, must not only beat the status quo but also every other
proposal. This gives the status quo a better chance. But if the voters do
not correctly interpret the situation, they may pass two contradictory
substantive motions, an outcome that is difficult to interpret.
To summarize, the crucial difference between agenda setting in the
two institutions is that the parliamentary procedure allows all the motions that any member wishes to bring out to enter the voting at some
point and reserves the most advantageous position for the status quo,
while the plebiscitary procedure allows the first pressure group to take
the opportunity to get a substantial advantage over latecomers and the
status quo.
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Let us now give the agendas of Figures 1 and 2 some names relevant
to the subject of Professor Baker's paper. Let SQ mean "continued busing," let B mean "an absolute end to busing," and let A mean "continued
busing but only for a new set of magnet schools." Let a racial minority
group order: SQAB, money savers order: BSQA, and school improvers order: ABSQ. Then, as shown in Figure 3, the racial minority gets its best
outcome in the representative system and its worst outcome in a plebiscite system.
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Of course, all this is pretty abstract. It assumes that participants
know others' preference orders; it assumes that opponents of the status
quo are clever enough to invent a motion that beats the status quo even
though it loses to other potential alternatives; it assumes that defenders
of the status quo or of alternative motions allow the opponents of the
status quo to seize the initiative and do nothing to attempt to win it back;
etc., etc. But these are not terribly difficult assumptions to satisfy in the
real world. Indeed, the fact that Eule and Bell wrote their essays seems
to me to indicate that they intuitively understood this, though they apparently did not write about it. So I think there is some reasonably solid
ground for the assertion that minorities have a better chance under a
representative system.
Does this new grounding also imply that courts ought to review plebiscitary legislation more carefully than representational legislation? I
think not. But it does, I think, give courts a new way of scrutinizing
plebiscitary legislation in applying the equal protection doctrine. The
fact that legislation comes through the plebiscitary process gives clues to
the identification of the group disadvantaged by the challenged legislation. Presumably courts are at least as capable as journalists in identifying the sponsors or agenda-makers for plebiscitary legislation and this is
a good test of whom the legislation advantages. This is not a due process
test of the plebiscitary process, but it is an enhancement of the equal
protection test.

